The history of joint acquisition programs in the U.S. Department of Defense reveals varied outcomes -- some positive, some negative. Joint program management is intended to reduce management costs and spread risks across participating services. Increased commonality theoretically yields economies of scale and savings that can be realized during the development, production, and support phases. However, joint management introduces significant complexity, while commonality also introduces significant technical challenges. Some joint programs have proved to be successful (e.g.

, the Joint Direct Attack Munition), while the complexity of joint requirements might have contributed to cost growth and schedule delays in other programs (e.g., F-35 Joint Strike Fighter), detracting from the benefits expected from commonality. The joint Future Vertical Lift (FVL) initiative asked RAND to examine joint management constructs and recommend strategies for improving both its internal organizational structure and its alignment with key external bodies. The authors draw a distinction between joint program management and commonality and argue that it is possible to achieve some degree of commonality without joint program management. Based on a review of historical joint initiatives, as well as a review of relevant business management literature, the authors identify some of the factors affecting joint program success and recommend ways to apply those lessons to the management of FVL.