1: Introduction 1.1: The Concepts of Personhood in African Philosophy 1.2: Developments in the Literature on Personhood 1.3: Themes and Structure of the Book 2: A Conceptual Mapping of Personhood 2.1: Introduction 2.2: Menkiti's Analysis of Personhood 2.3: Gyekye on Personhood 2.4: Matolino, Kaphagawani, and Ikuenobe on Personhood 2.

5: Conclusion 3: An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory 3,1: Introduction 3.2: Being Human and Being a Person 3.3: Personhood Embodies a Character-Based Ethics 3.4: Means and Ends in Personhood 3.5: Humanism and the Instrumentality of Relationships 3.6: Rejection of Social Relationships as the Moral End 3.7: The Role of Relationships in Personhood 3.8: Conclusion 4: Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality 4.

1: Introduction 4.2: Contextualising the debate Partiality and Impartiality in Moral Philosophy 4.3: Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality? 4.4: Conclusion 5: Personhood and Options in African Moral Thought 5.1: Introduction 5.2: Wiredu's Approach to Moral Philosophy 5.3: Tshivhase's Criticism of Personhood 5.4: Conclusion 6: Personhood and Dignity in African Philosophy 6.

1: Introduction 6.2: Ikuenobe's Conception of Dignity 6.3: Personhood and Dignity 6.4: Personhood, Partiality and Dignity 6.5: The Young and the Marginal Cases, and Dignity 6.6: Conclusion 7: Personhood as a Political Theory of Duties 7.1: Introduction 7.2: The Idea of Rights 7.

3: Menkiti and Two Conceptions of Personhood 7.4: The Minimalist Conception of Personhood and Rights 7.5: The Maximalist Conception of Personhood and Duties 7.6: Conclusion.