Introduction F. Scott Kieff and Troy A. Paredes; Part I. The Board of Directors and the CEO: 1. The trouble with boards Lawrence E. Mitchell; 2. Rediscovering board expertise: legal implications of the empirical literature Lawrence A. Cunningham; 3.
The CEO and the board: on CEO overconfidence and institutionalizing dissent in firms F. Scott Kieff and Troy A. Paredes; Part II. The Why, When, How, and How Much of Executive Pay: 4. Pay without performance: overview of the issues Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried; 5. Supersize pay, incentive compatibility, and the volatile shareholder interest William W.
Bratton; 6. 'Say on pay': cautionary notes on the UK experience and the case for muddling through Jeffrey N. Gordon; Part III. Constraining Managers and Directors: Investors, Securities Regulation, and the Media: 7. Shareholder activism in the Obama era Stephen M. Bainbridge; 8. After Dura: causation in fraud-on-the-market actions Merritt B. Fox; 9.
From boardroom to courtroom to newsroom: the media and the corporate governance scandals Kathleen F. Brickey; Part IV. Delaware Versus Congress: On the Federalization of Corporate Governance: 10. How Delaware law can support better corporate governance James D. Cox; 11. Federalism versus federalization: preserving the division of responsibility in corporation law E. Norman Veasey, Shawn Pompian and Christine Di Guglielmo; Part V. Comparative Corporate Governance: 12.
Regulatory differences in bank and capital market regulation Hideki Kanda; 13. European corporate governance after five years with Sarbanes-Oxley Rainer Kulms; Epilogue. Three secular trends of corporate law Joel Seligman.orporate governance scandals Kathleen F. Brickey; Part IV. Delaware Versus Congress: On the Federalization of Corporate Governance: 10. How Delaware law can support better corporate governance James D. Cox; 11.
Federalism versus federalization: preserving the division of responsibility in corporation law E. Norman Veasey, Shawn Pompian and Christine Di Guglielmo; Part V. Comparative Corporate Governance: 12. Regulatory differences in bank and capital market regulation Hideki Kanda; 13. European corporate governance after five years with Sarbanes-Oxley Rainer Kulms; Epilogue. Three secular trends of corporate law Joel Seligman.orporate governance scandals Kathleen F. Brickey; Part IV.
Delaware Versus Congress: On the Federalization of Corporate Governance: 10. How Delaware law can support better corporate governance James D. Cox; 11. Federalism versus federalization: preserving the division of responsibility in corporation law E. Norman Veasey, Shawn Pompian and Christine Di Guglielmo; Part V. Comparative Corporate Governance: 12. Regulatory differences in bank and capital market regulation Hideki Kanda; 13. European corporate governance after five years with Sarbanes-Oxley Rainer Kulms; Epilogue.
Three secular trends of corporate law Joel Seligman.orporate governance scandals Kathleen F. Brickey; Part IV. Delaware Versus Congress: On the Federalization of Corporate Governance: 10. How Delaware law can support better corporate governance James D. Cox; 11. Federalism versus federalization: preserving the division of responsibility in corporation law E. Norman Veasey, Shawn Pompian and Christine Di Guglielmo; Part V.
Comparative Corporate Governance: 12. Regulatory differences in bank and capital market regulation Hideki Kanda; 13. European corporate governance after five years with Sarbanes-Oxley Rainer Kulms; Epilogue. Three secular trends of corporate law Joel Seligman.orate Governance: 12. Regulatory differences in bank and capital market regulation Hideki Kanda; 13. European corporate governance after five years with Sarbanes-Oxley Rainer Kulms; Epilogue. Three secular trends of corporate law Joel Seligman.