The COVID-19 pandemic led to a substantial drop in U.S. economic activity in 2020. Businesses often purchase business interruption coverage for loss of revenue due to fires and other perils, but insurers have held that in most cases they are not obligated to cover the enormous losses caused by COVID-19. Now, insurers, insurance industry trade groups, policyholder groups, and Congress have developed proposals to expand the availability of insurance for pandemic-induced business closures or restrictions. The programs differ in several key dimensions, including the amount of risk borne by commercial insurers, the approach to paying claims, the extent to which the U.S. government receives a premium for the risk it bears, and the extent of policyholder subsidies.

But the programs all seek to define benefits and the benefit distribution mechanism in advance rather than rely on programs hastily crafted after an event occurs. The authors describe the distinguishing features of the most-visible proposals and develop a quantitative model that projects their potential consequences. Proposed programs are evaluated in terms of the proportion of revenue decline replaced (efficacy), efficiency, affordability, the risk borne by the commercial insurers, expected annual government net outlays, and the amount of subsidy provided to policyholders. This analysis provides information useful to assessing the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches for improving the availability and affordability of pandemic risk insurance.