Preface.1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons:2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.4.

Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.Part II: Signalling:5. Job Market Signalling.6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.8.

Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.Part III: Moral Hazard:9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations.10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.12.

Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions:13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.14. Auction Design: Theory.15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.16.

Concluding Comments.Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.