Foreword -- Introduction -- Public Perceptions of Nuclear Energy -- Psychological Aspects of Risk Perception -- Public Response to a Major Failure of a Controversial Technology -- Institutional Responses to Different Perceptions of Risk -- Local Responses to Nuclear Plants -- Reactions of Local Residents to the Accident at Three Mile Island -- Report of the Task Group on Behavioral Effects -- Community Attitudes Toward Nuclear Plants -- Emergence of Community Doubts at Plymouth, Massachusetts -- Institutional Responsibilities for Nuclear Energy -- Social Aspects of Nuclear Regulation -- Who Should Be Responsible for Public Safety? -- The Accident at Three Mile Island: The Contribution of the Social Sciences to the Evaluation of Emergency Preparedness and Response -- The Public's Right to Know: The Accident at Three Mile Island -- The Role of the Expert at Three Mile Island -- The Interaction of Social and Technical Systems -- Human Factors in the Design and Operation of Reactor Safety Systems -- The Human Equation in Operating a Nuclear-Power Plant -- The President's Commission and the Normal Accident -- On the Design and Management of Nearly Error-Free Organizational Control Systems -- Implications for Public Policy -- The President's Commission: Its Analysis of the Human Equation -- Some Lessons Learned.