Answering Moral Skepticism
Answering Moral Skepticism
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Author(s): Kagan, Shelly
ISBN No.: 9780197688977
Pages: 406
Year: 202411
Format: Trade Cloth (Hard Cover)
Price: $ 127.26
Dispatch delay: Dispatched between 7 to 15 days
Status: Available (On Demand)

Acknowledgments A Note to the Reader Introduction 1. What Would Morality Need to Be? 1.1 Job Descriptions 1.2 Possible Elements 1.3 Satisfying the Job Description 2. Basic Positions in Metaethics 2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism 2.


2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism 2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism 2.4 Moral Skepticism 3. Nihilism 3.1 The Nature of Nihilism 3.2 The Case for Nihilism 3.3 Disregarding the Arguments 3.


4 Normative Nihilism 4. Noncognitivism 4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism 4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism 4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism 5. Disagreement 5.1 The Argument from Disagreement 5.2 The Implications of Disagreement 5.


3 Explaining Moral Disagreement 5.4 Nonconvergence 6. Relativism 6.1 Moral Relativism 6.2 Clarifying Relativism 6.3 Arguing for Relativism 6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories 7. Knowledge 7.


1 The Analogy to Observation 7.2 Appearances 7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions 7.4 Reliability 7.5 Intuitionism 8. Evolution 8.1 The Argument from Evolution 8.2 A Second Try 8.


3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics 8.4 Common Ground 8.5 The Continuity Problem 8.6 Path Dependence 9. Explanation 9.1 A Metaphysical Test 9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts 9.3 Reduction and Explanation 9.


4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts 9.5 The Unrestricted Test 10. Motivation 10.1 Motive Internalism 10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism 10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism 10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation 10.5 The Direction of Fit 11.


Reasons 11.1 Reasons Internalism 11.2 Reasons 11.3 Refining the Argument 11.4 Hypothetical Reasons 11.5 Rational Support 11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation 12. Reductionism 12.


1 The Appeal of Reductionism 12.2 The Nature of Reduction 12.3 The Open Question Argument 12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind 12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction 12.6 Reducing Reasons 13. Simple Realism 13.1 Simple Normative Realism 13.


2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity 13.3 Nonnatural Properties 13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals 14. Moral Realism 14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic 14.2 Systematic Moral Theory Notes References Index.


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