For over thirty years the Israeli nuclear doctrine has amounted to an ambiguous pledge that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Yair Evron assesses the more general danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, focusing on the question of Israel's nuclear capability. He illuminates both the history of Israel's nuclear posture and the responses of Arab states. Paying particular attention to the Gulf War, he considers the range of probable nuclear scenarios and outlines the implications of Israeli policy for the region. The consensus among unofficial observers is that Israel, despite official denials, has in fact assembled an extensive nuclear arsenal. Evron reconstructs from a variety of sources the probable history of Israel's nuclear weapons program. As he summarizes domestic debates among defense elites and civilians, the author explains why Israeli leaders across the political spectrum have not chosen an explicit nuclear policy. Surveying diverse reactions in Egypt, Libya, Iran, and Iraq, Evron analyzes the decision of major Arab countries other than Iraq to refrain from developing their own nuclear weapons.

After examining the failures and successes of Israel's conventional deterrence strategies, Evron considers the potential impact of nuclear proliferation on regional stability. He then turns to the strategic relationship between Iraq and Israel between 1989 and 1991, addressing the threat of nuclear and chemical warfare during the Gulf crisis. In conclusion, Evron evaluates Israel's security concerns and defense options for the future.