With the current revival of interest in the philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, Giuseppina D'Oro has written this detailed examination of Collingwood's 'Essay on Philosophical Method', bringing fresh insight to Collingwood's approach. What is distinctive about D'Oros work is her retrieval and reconfiguration of themes from the Essay on Method, the close linking together of the Essay on Method with Collingwood's intricate and controversial 'Essay on Metaphysics' and the engagement of Collingwood's thought with the preoccupation's of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. D'Oro's treatment of Collingwood is a rich and nuanced study of controversies which even today lie at the centre of important discussions in philosophy of mind and action and, beyond that, in metaphysics. Collingwood thought that philosophy does its work in a characteristic but only imperfectly understood way, concerned with identifying and, in a way, vindicating the justifying standards that are used or can be used in specific scentific enquiries. D'Oro examines Collingwood's treatment of the subject matter of philosophy, the ontological argument, the nature of philosophical enquiry and problems and contrasts the Collingwoodian method with those of Oxford realism, logical positivism, pragmatism, ordinary language philosophy and pre-critical and Kantian metaphysics. The book gives an overview of Collingwood's life and work and concludes with a discussion of the nature of Collingwood's contribution to contemporary philosophy of action, especially the 'reasons versus causes' dispute.