Wall Street has always been a dangerous place. Firms have been going in and out of business ever since speculators ï¬rst gathered under a buttonÂwood tree near the southern tip of Manhattan in the late eighteenth century. Despite the ongoing risks, during great swaths of its mostly charmed 142 years, Goldman Sachs has been both envied and feared for having the best talent, the best clients, and the best political connections, and for its ability to alchemize them into extreme proï¬tability and market prowess. Indeed, of the many ongoing mysteries about Goldman Sachs, one of the most overarching is just how it makes so much money, year in and year out, in good times and in bad, all the while revealing as little as posÂsible to the outside world about how it does it. Another-- equally confounding-- mystery is the ï¬rm''s steadfast, zealous belief in its ability to manage its multitude of internal and external conflicts better than any other beings on the planet. The combination of these two genetic strains-- the ability to make boatloads of money at will and to appear to manage conflicts that have humbled, then humiliated lesser ï¬rms-- has made Goldman Sachs the envy of its ï¬nancial- services brethren. But it is also something else altogether: a symbol of immutable global power and unparalleled connections, which Goldman is shameÂless in exploiting for its own beneï¬t, with little concern for how its sucÂcess affects the rest of us. The ï¬rm has been described as everything from "a cunning cat that always lands on its feet" to, now famously, "a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money," by Rolling Stone writer Matt Taibbi.
The ï¬rm''s inexorable success leaves people wondering: Is Goldman Sachs better than everyone else, or have they found ways to win time and time again by cheating? But in the early twenty- ï¬rst century, thanks to the fallout from Goldman''s very success, the ï¬rm is looking increasingly vulnerable. To be sure, the ï¬rm has survived plenty of previous crises, starting with the Depression, when much of the ï¬rm''s capital was lost in a scam of its own creation, and again in the late 1940s, when Goldman was one of sevenÂteen Wall Street ï¬rms put on trial and accused of collusion by the federal government. In the past forty years, as a consequence of numerous scanÂdals involving rogue traders, suicidal clients, and charges of insider tradÂing, the ï¬rm has come far closer-- repeatedly-- to ï¬nancial collapse than its reputation would attest. Each of these previous threats changed Goldman in some meaningÂful way and forced the ï¬rm to adapt to the new laws that either the marÂket or regulators imposed. This time will be no different. What is different for Goldman now, though, is that for the ï¬rst time since 1932-- when Sidney Weinberg, then Goldman''s senior partner, knew that he could quickly reach his friend, President- elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt-- the ï¬rm no longer appears to have sympathetic high- level relationships in Washington. Goldman''s friends in high places, so crucial to the ï¬rm''s extraordinary success, are abandoning it. Indeed, in today''s charged political climate, which is polarized along socioeconomic lines, Goldman seems particularly isolated and demonized.
Certainly Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman''s ï¬fty-six- year- old chairman and CEO, has no friend in President Barack Obama, despite being invited to a recent state dinner for the president of China. According to Newsweek columnist Jonathan Alter''s book The Promise, the "angriest" Obama got during his ï¬rst year in ofï¬ce was when he heard Blankfein justify the ï¬rm''s $16.2 billion of bonuses in 2009 by claiming "Goldman was never in danger of collapse" during the ï¬nancial crisis that began in 2007. According to Alter, President Obama told a friend that Blankfein''s statement was "flatly untrue" and added for good measure, "These guys want to be paid like rock stars when all they''re doing is lip- synching capÂitalism." Complicating the ï¬rm''s efforts to be better understood by the American public-- a group Goldman has never cared to serve-- is a long-standing reticence among many of the ï¬rm''s current and former execuÂtives, bankers, and traders to engage with the media in a constructive way. Even retired Goldman partners feel compelled to check with the ï¬rm''s disciplined administrative bureaucracy, run by John F. W. Rogers-- a former chief of staff to James Baker, both at the White House and at the State Department-- before agreeing to be interviewed.
Most have likely signed conï¬dentiality or nondisparagement agreements as a condition of their departures from the ï¬rm. Should they make themÂselves available, unlike bankers and traders at other ï¬rms-- where self-aggrandizement in the press at the expense of colleagues is typical-- Goldman types stay ï¬rmly on the message that what matters most is the Goldman team, not any one individual on it. "They''re extremely disciplined," explained one private- equity execÂutive who both competes and invests with Goldman. "They understand probably better than anybody how to never take the game face off. You''ll never get a Goldman banker after three beers saying, ''You know, listen, my colleagues are a bunch of fucking dickheads.'' They just don''t do that the way other guys will, whether it''s because they tend to keep the uniÂform on for a longer stretch of time so they''re not prepared to damage their squad, or whether or not it''s because they''re afraid of crossing the powers that be, once they''ve taken the blood oath. they maintain that discipline in a kind of eerily successful way." Anyone who might have forgotten how dangerous Wall Street can be was reminded of it again, in spades, beginning in early 2007, as the market for home mortgages in the United States began to crack, and then implode, leading to the demise or near demise a year or so later of several large Wall Street ï¬rms that had been around for generations-- including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch-- as well as other large ï¬nancial institutions such as Citigroup, AIG, Washington Mutual, and Wachovia.
Although it underwrote billions of dollars of mortgage securities, Goldman Sachs avoided the worst of the crisis, thanks largely to a fully authorized, well- timed proprietary bet by a small group of Goldman traders-- led by Dan Sparks, Josh Birnbaum, and Michael Swenson-- beginning in December 2006, that the housing bubble would collapse and that the securities tied to home mortgages would rapidly lose value. They were right. In July 2007, David Viniar, Goldman''s longtime chief ï¬nancial ofï¬Âcer, referred to this proprietary bet as "the big short" in an e-mail he wrote to Blankfein and others. During 2007, as other ï¬rms lost billions of dollars writing down the value of mortgage- related securities on their balÂance sheets, Goldman was able to offset its own mortgage- related losses with huge gains-- of some $4 billion-- from its bet the housing market would fall. Goldman earned a net proï¬t in 2007 of $11.4 billion-- then a record for the ï¬rm-- and its top ï¬ve executives split $322 million, another record on Wall Street. Blankfein, who took over the leadership of the ï¬rm in June 2006 when his predecessor, Henry Paulson Jr., became treasury secretary, received total compensation for the year of $70.
3 milÂlion. The following year, while many of Goldman''s competitors were ï¬ghting for their lives-- a ï¬ght many of them would lose-- Goldman made a "substantial proï¬t of $2.3 billion," Blankfein wrote in an April 27, 2009, letter. Given the carnage on Wall Street in 2008, Goldman''s top ï¬ve executives decided to eschew their bonuses. For his part, Blankfein made do with total compensation for the year of $1.1 million. (Not to worry, though; his 3.37 million Goldman shares are still worth around $570 million.
) Nothing in the ï¬nancial world happens in a vacuum these days, given the exponential growth of trillions of dollars of securities tied to the value of other securities-- known as "derivatives"--and the extraordinarÂily complex and internecine web of global trading relationships. AccountÂing rules in the industry promote these interrelationships by requiring ï¬rms to check constantly with one another about the value of securities on their balance sheets to make sure that value is reflected as accurately as possible. Naturally, since judgment is involved, especially with ever more complex securities, disagreements among traders about values are common. Goldman Sachs prides itself on being a "mark- to- market" ï¬rm, Wall Street argot for being ruthlessly precise about the value of the securities-- known as "marks"--on its balance sheet. Goldman believes its precision promotes transparency, allowing the ï¬rm and its investors to make better decisions, including the decision to bet the mortgage market would collapse in 2007. "Because we are a mark- to- market ï¬rm," BlankÂfein once wrote, "we believe the assets on our balance sheet are a true and realistic reflection of book value." If, for instance, Goldman observed that demand for a certain security or group of like securities was changÂing or that exogenous events-- such as the expected bursting of a housing bubble-- could lower the value of its portfolio of housing- relat.