Volume IForeword by William J. PerryForeword by John D. FeerickForeword by Claire FinkelsteinForeword to First Edition by Robert S. McNamaraForeword to First Edition by David W. LeebronForeword to First Edition by Kosta TsipisPrefaceAcknowledgementsIntroductionPART I: The LawChapter 1: The Law as Seen by the United StatesSources of International LawSummary as to Applicable SourcesNature and Purpose of the Law of Armed ConflictPolitical Nature of the Law of Armed ConflictBinding Nature of International LawMain Corpus of the Law of Armed ConflictJus ad Bellum and Jus in BelloGeneral Rules of the Law of Armed ConflictPrinciple of ProportionalityPrinciple of NecessityPrinciple of ModerationPrinciple of DistinctionRule of Civilian ImmunityLimits on Target Area BombingPrinciple of NeutralityProhibition of Chemical WeaponsProhibition of Bacteriological/Biological AgentsPrinciple of Environmental ProtectionProtection of Medical FacilitiesProhibition of GenocideThe Martens ClausePrinciple of AnalogyPrinciple of HumanityPrinciple of ReciprocityReprisalsMental StateCrimes Under International LawProhibitive Nature of Law of Armed ConflictBases for a Per Se RuleConclusionChapter 2: The Law as Applied by the United States Operational PlanningPrerequisites for a Per Se RuleGeneral Applicability of the Rules of International Law to Nuclear WeaponsInternational Agreements on Nuclear WeaponsInternational Agreements on Other WeaponsSources of International LawThe Martens ClauseProhibition of Causing Unnecessary SufferingControllability of Effects of Nuclear WeaponsLow-Yield Nuclear WeaponsSignificance of Probabilities as to Potential Nuclear Counterstrikes and EscalationPrinciple of ProportionalityTime Frame for Determining LawfulnessEffects of Nuclear Versus Conventional WeaponsPrinciple of Distrinction/Civilian ImmunityCrimes against Humanity; GenocideProhibition of PoisonsPoison Gas AnalogyPrinciple of NeutralityEnvironmental SecurityInternational Agreements on Human RightsThe Resolutions ArgumentReprisalsNuclear DeterrenceChapter 3: The ICJ''s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Decision The Issue PresentedThe Court''s ConclusionUnique Characteristics of Nuclear WeaponsFinding of Insufficient FactsApparent Unlawfulness of High-Yield Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Weapons for Self-DefenseU.N. Charter ProvisionsThe Court''s Refusal to Engage in Risk AnalysisIdentification of Risk FactorsThe Lotus/Sovereignty IssuePattern of Specific InstrumentsCovenant on Civil and Political RightsGenocide ConventionProtection of the EnvironmentPoisonous WeaponsAgreed Limitations on Use of Nuclear WeaponsPractice of Non-UseNuclear DeterrenceU.N.

General Assembly Resolutions International Humanitarian LawJus CogensPrinciple of Distinction/Civilian ImmunityPrinciple of NecessityPrinciple of NeutralityRequirements for a Per Se Rule to AriseLegal Limitations on the Lawfulness of ReprisalsWhether the Court Found a Non LiquetLegal Status in the Absence of Applicable LawPurposes Underlying the Law of Armed ConflictSources of International LawMental StateSignificance of a Finding of IllegalityDuty to Negotiate Disarmament Under Article VI of the NPTCharacterization of the Court''s DecisionPART II: Additional Applicable Principles of LawChapter 4: Prerequisites for a Per Se RuleU.S. LawGenerally Accepted Principles of LawChapter 5: Interpreting International Law According to Its PurposeChapter 6: The Legal Significance of Probabilities as to the Potential Effects of the Use of Nuclear WeaponsU.S. LawGenerally Accepted Principles of Law Chapter 7: Probability Analysis Under Generally Accepted Principles of Criminal Law--Rules as to Recklessness and ForeseeabilityChapter 8: Recklessness under the Law of Armed ConflictWar Crimes Liability of StatesCriminal Liability of IndividualsWillfulness as Including RecklessnessRecognition by International Criminal Tribunals of Recklessness as a Sufficient Mens Rea forSome War CrimesLiability for Aiding and Abetting and Other Types of Joint ResponsibilityCommander LiabilityPotential Criminal Liability of CorporationsChapter 9: Limitations on the Extent to Which Innocent Third-Parties May be Endangered in the Exercise of Otherwise Lawful Uses of ForceChapter 10: The Lesser Evil/Necessity PrincipleChapter 11: Legal Effect of Having Caused One''s Own Need to Resort to Extreme ForcePART III: Additional Legal History and PrinciplesChapter 12: The Evolution of International Law as to LandminesChapter 13: Inapplicability of the Principle of Double EffectPART IV: Risk Factors of the Nuclear Weapons RegimeChapter 14: Risk Factors as to the Weapons ThemselvesDelivery Vehicles and WarheadsCategories of Nuclear WeaponsRadiation Effects of Nuclear WeaponsEffects of Nuclear Weapons at Various YieldsClimate Effects of Nuclear ExchangesLevels at Which Nuclear Weapons Would Likely Be Used in a Nuclear WarMedical Care in the Aftermath of a Nuclear StrikePotential Effects of Electromagnetic PulsesEffects of Nuclear Weapons TestingHuman Experience of Effects of Nuclear Weapons TestingChernobylChapter 15: Risk Factors Inherent in U.S. Declaratory Policy as to Nuclear WeaponsThe Military Principle of Concentration of ForceExtended DeterrenceThe Logic of Deterrence as Hinging Upon the IrrationalChapter 16: Risk Factors Inherent in U.S.

Operational Capabilities and PlanningChapter 17: U.S. Nuclear Force Structure and Related Risk FactorsOverall Nuclear ArsenalStrategic Nuclear ArsenalTactical Nuclear ArsenalEmphasis on Strategic Nuclear WeaponsChanges in InventoryChanges in Inventory Since 2002Misleading Nature of Reductions in NumbersVolume IIChapter 18: Times the United States Threatened or Considered the Use of Nuclear WeaponsChapter 19: Probabilities as to Accuracy of U.S. Targeting of Nuclear WeaponsChapter 20: Risk Factors Inherent in Nuclear Deterrence and Operational ReadinessReality of the RisksRisks of Precipitating Nuclear WarFostering of an Arms RaceFostering of Nuclear ProliferationRisks of TerrorismRisks of Human and Equipment FailureRisks to Command and ControlRisks of TestingRisks of Production, Storage and DisposalFinancial CostsJeopardy to Rule of LawCatastrophe TheoryRisks of Unstable, Impulsive, Incompetent or Ill-intentioned Leaders of Nuclear Weapons StatesConclusion Chapter 21: Nuclear Weapons States and Concerns as to their Command and Control Chapter 22: Recognition that the Use of Nuclear Weapons Would Serve No Military PurposeStatements by U.S. Political LeadershipStatements by U.S.

Military LeadershipStatements by Foreign LeadersStatements by Defense ExpertsChapter 23: Likelihood Even a Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons Would Escalate into Widescale Nuclear War--Inconsistency of this Reality with the U.S. Nuclear War PlanStatements by U.S. Civilian LeadersStatements by U.S. Military LeadersStatements by Policy ExpertsRussian PerspectiveChapter 24: Risks of Nuclear Weapons in the Contemporary WorldTerrorismThe United States'' Continued Legitimization of Nuclear WeaponsU.S.

Nuclear HegemonyRisks of High Alert Levels Launch on WarningModernization ProgramsIrony of the United States'' Continued Legitimization of Nuclear WeaponsMissile DefenseRising Tensions Between the U.S. and RussiaStalemate as to Arms ControlCyber Security RisksEffects of Nuclear Weapons Worse than Previously ThoughtChapter 25: Risk that Even a Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons Would Precipitate Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons in Retaliation, and Vice VersaInterrelatedness of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons RisksRisks of Chemical and Biological WeaponsLegal Regime as to Chemical and Biological WeaponsDestructiveness of Chemical and Biological WeaponsChemical and Biological Weapons StatesProliferation RisksChemical and Biological Weapons as a Major Security ThreatChemical and Biological Weapons in the World''s Hot SpotsNuclear Deterrence as Directed Against Chemical and Biological WeaponsPrior Use of Chemical Weapons as a Risk FactorSignificance of the United States'' Joining of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions Chapter 26: The High Tech Conventional Weapons AlternativeEvolution of Conventional WeaponsConventional Prompt Global Strike and Other Potentially Highly Accurate Long-Range Conventional Weapons Programs in DevelopmentHardened and Deeply Buried TargetsThe Potential Replacement of Nuclear Deterrence with Conventional DeterrencePART V: Application of the Law to the FactsChapter 27: Unlawfulness of Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons under Rules of the Law of Armed Conflict As Articulated by the United StatesThe Law of Armed Conflict as Including the Rules of Customary International LawUncontrollability of the Effects of Nuclear Weapons as Connoting the Unlawfulness of the Use of Such Weapons under the Law of Armed ConflictU.S. Formal Position as to the Controllability of the Effects of Nuclear WeaponsU.S. Acknowledgment of the Uncontrollability of Nuclear Weapons EffectsThe Fact of the Uncontrollability of Nuclear Weapons Effects Further Bases of UnlawfulnessUnlawfulness under the Rule of DistinctionUnlawfulness under the Rule of ProportionalityUnlawfulness under the Rule of NecessityUnlawfulness under the Law of ReprisalSelf-Defense as Subject to International LawWar CrimesUnlawfulness of the U.S.

Policy of Nuclear DeterrenceConclusionChapter 28: Unlawfulness of Nuclear Weapons Threat and Use under Additional Rules of the Law of Armed ConflictInternational Law of Risk CreationInternational Law as to CausationMens Rea Requirements for War Crimes LiabilityCrimes against Peace, Crimes against Humanity, and GenocideForeseeable Nuclear Counter-Attacks and EscalationRule of NeutralityRule of PrecautionDelayed and Inter-Generational Injury Policy of Deterrence as Threatening Use of High-Yield Nuclear WeaponsPreemptive Use of Nuclear WeaponsThe Martens ClauseThe Invalidity of the "As Such" RuleThe Federalist Papers and Nuclear WeaponsDenial and the Nature of EvilConventional Weapons AlternativeConventional Weapons and the Rule of NecessitySuperf.