PART 1 Constructing A Game 1 Introduction to Strategic Reasoning 1.1 Introduction 1.2 A Sampling of Strategic Situations 1.3 Whetting Your Appetite: The Game of Concentration 1.4 Psychological Profile of a Player 1.5 Playing the Gender Pronoun Game 2. Building a Model of a Strategic Situation 2.1 Introduction 2.
2 Extensive Form Games: Perfect Information 2.3 Extensive Form Games: Imperfect Information 2.4 What Is a Strategy? 2.5 Strategic Form Games 2.6 Moving from the Extensive Form and Strategic Form 2.7 Going from the Strategic Form to the Extensive Form 2.8 Common Knowledge 2.9 A Few More Issues in Modeling Games PART 2 Strategic Form Games 3.
Eliminating the Impossible: Solving a Game when Rationality Is Common Knowledge 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Solving a Game when Players Are Rational 3.3 Solving a Game when Players Are Rational and Players Know that Players Are Rational 3.4 Solving a Game when Rationality Is Common Knowledge 3.5 Do people believe that people believe that people are rational? 3.6 Appendix: Strict and Weak Dominance 3.7 Appendix: Rationalizability (Advanced) 3.
8 Appendix: Strict Dominance with Randomization 4. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two or Three Players 4.1 Defining Nash Equilibrium 4.2 Classic Two-Player Games 4.3 The Best-Reply Method 4.4 Three-Player Games 4.5 Foundations of Nash Equilibrium 4.6 Fictitious Play and Convergence to Nash Equilibrium 4.
6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Nash Equilibrium 5. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete n-Player Games 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Symmetric Games 5.3 Asymmetric Games 5.4 Selecting among Nash Equilibria 6. Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games 6.1 Introduction 6.
2 Solving for Nash Equilibria without Calculus 6.3 Solving for Nash Equilibria with Calculus 7. Keep ''Em Guessing: Randomized Strategies 7.1 Police Patrols and the Drug Trade 7.2 Making Decisions under Uncertainty 7.3 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium 7.4 Examples 7.5 Advanced Examples 7.
6 Pessimism and Games of Pure Conflict 7.7 Appendix: Formal Definition of Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies PART 3 Extensive Form Games 8. Taking Turns: Sequential Games with Perfect Information 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 8.3 Examples 8.4 Waiting Games: Preemption and Attrition 8.5 Do People Reason Using Backward Induction? 9.
Taking Turns in the Dark: Sequential Games with Imperfect Information 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 9.3 Examples 9.4 Commitment 9.5 Forward Induction PART 4 Games of Incomplete Information 10. I Know Something You Don''t Know: Games with Private Information 10.1 Introduction 10.
2 A Game of Incomplete Information: The Munich Agreement 10.3 Bayesian Games and Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 10.4 When All Players Have Private Information: Auctions 10.5 Voting on Committees and Juries 10.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 10.7 Appendix: First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auction with a Continuum of Types 11. What You Do Tells Me Who You Are: Signaling Games 11.1 Introduction 11.
2 Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium 11.3 Examples 11.4 Selecting Among Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibria: The Intuitive Criterion 11.5 Appendix: Bayes''s Rule and Updating Beliefs 11.6 Appendix: Formal Definition of Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium for Signaling Games 12. Lies and the Lying Liars That Tell Them: Cheap Talk Games 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Communication in a Game-Theoretic World 12.
3 Signaling Information 12.4 Signaling Intentions PART 5 Repeated Games 13. Playing Forever: Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Players 13.1 Trench Warfare in World War I 13.2 Constructing a Repeated Game 13.3 Trench Warfare: Finite Horizon 13.4 Trench Warfare: Infinite Horizon 13.5 Some Experimental Evidence for the Repeated Prisoners'' Dilemma 13.
6 Appendix: Present Value of a Payoff Stream 13.7 Appendix: Dynamic Programming 14. Cooperation and Reputation: Applications of Repeated Interaction with Infinitely Lived Player 14.1 Introduction 14.2 A Menu of Punishments 14.3 Quid-Pro-Quo 14.4 Reputation 14.5 Imperfect Monitoring and Antiballistic Missiles 15.
Interaction in Infinitely Lived Institutions 15.1 Introductions 15.2 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations 15.3 Cooperation in a Large Population PART 6 Evolutionary Game Theory 16. Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 16.1 Introducing Evolutionary Game Theory 16.2 Hawk-Dove Conflict 16.3 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy 16.
4 Properties of an ESS 16.5 Multipopulation Games 16.6 Evolution of Spite 17. Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Replicator Dynamics 17.1 Introduction 17.2 Replicator Dynamics and the Hawk-Dove Game 17.3 General Definition of the Replicator Dynamic 17.4 ESS and Attractors of the Replicator Dynamic 17.
5 Examples Solutions to "Check Your Understanding" Questions Glossary Index.